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Abstract 
 
In recent years, film scholars have been increasingly preoccupied with questions as to 
how films can ‘be’ or ‘do’ or ‘be used for’ philosophy. From the ‘be used for’ position, films 
are seen as mere examples or jumping-off points to philosophy ‘proper’; from the ‘be’ 
position, films are seen as philosophy, as simply another form of philosophical 
argumentation; and from the ‘do’ position, films are seen as examples or illustrations of 
preexisting philosophical positions/protocols. In this essay, I will operate primarily from 
the ‘do’ position and explore how Quentin Tarantino ‘does’ ordinary language philosophy. 
Renowned for his innovative and influential dialogue, I intend to shine a light on a 
neglected aspect of Tarantino’s writing style and examine, with reference to the work of 
ordinary language philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and Stanley 
Cavell, the argumentative protocols discernible in Pulp Fiction (1994). More specifically, I 
will analyze the famous ‘foot massage argument’, utilizing such concepts as ‘projective 
imagination’, ‘explaining the syntactics’, and ‘demonstrating the semantics’, in the hopes 
of indicating the fecundity of the continued study of Tarantino’s justly famous dialogue. I 
also intend to broaden my investigation to consider, in light of responses to this material 
during the IFVCR Network conference and in light of current discussions within film 
studies, the disciplinary implications vis-à-vis film-philosophy of conducting such ordinary 
language investigations of dialogue and communication in film. 
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1. Introduction  
 
If what I have been aiming at is indeed 
some fragment of a view of expression 
… the view is meant in service of 
something I want from moral theory, 
namely a systematic recognition of 
speech as confrontation, as 
demanding, as owed … I might say 
that my view of the role of ordinary 
language in relation to the imperative 
of expression is that it is less in need 
of weeding than of cultivation. 
Otherwise, as we stand, we are 
stopped short in the obligation to 
make our desires, hence our actions, 
intelligible (and to ourselves) and 
hampered in our demand and right to 
be found intelligible in those desires 
and actions, to ask residence in the 
shared realm of reason. 
     – Stanley Cavell (2005, 196–197) 
 
In recent years, film scholars have been 
increasingly preoccupied with questions 
as to how films can ‘be’ or ‘do’ or ‘be 
used for’ philosophy. From the ‘be used 
for’ position, films are seen as examples 
or jumping-off points to philosophy 
‘proper’; from the ‘be’ position, films are 
seen as philosophy, as simply another 
form of philosophical argumentation; and 
from the ‘do’ position, films are seen as 
examples or illustrations of preexisting 
philosophical positions or protocols.1 The 
stakes, ontologically speaking, of what 
film ‘is’ or ‘does’ in this respect are 
substantial; at stake, in the minds of 
some scholars, is the very identity of 
what has come to be known as ‘film-
philosophy’.2 																																																													
1 For two particularly insightful considerations of 
these locutions and their implications for film 
studies, see Thomas E. Wartenberg (2007, 11–13, 
117–132) and Daniel Morgan (2012, 25–27). 
 
2Film-philosophy is still in the process of 
establishing itself as a viable alternative to film 
studies orthodoxy. For the probative value of film-
As near as I can tell, to worry about 
which one of these positions alone is 
right is to underestimate the range of 
things that filmmakers can do via film 
and that viewers can do with films, and, 
by extension, to impoverish the discipline 
of film studies. Contrary to such myopia, 
it is my contention that all three of these 
positions are valid and that it is possible 
for certain films to be approached from 
any single, any combination of, or all 
three of these position(s). For the 
purpose of this essay, I will ‘use’ film – 
the Quentin Tarantino film Pulp Fiction 
(1994) in particular – to illustrate 
concepts in ordinary language 
philosophy as formulated in the work of 
such thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. 
Austin, and Stanley Cavell. At the same 
time, I will demonstrate, over the course 
of an in-depth analysis of the argument 
between the characters Vincent Vega 
(John Travolta) and Jules Winfield 
(Samuel L. Jackson) which I will refer to 
as ‘the foot massage argument’, how 
Tarantino ‘does’ ordinary language 
philosophy. Finally, I will explore the 
implications of conducting such ordinary 
language investigations of films for the 
future of film-philosophy. 
 																																																																																								
philosophy, see, beyond the individual 
contributions to the groundbreaking Film-
Philosophy journal and the work of such 
philosophical heralds as Stanley Cavell ([1971] 
1979, 1981, 1996, 2004, 2005) and Noël Carroll 
(1988a, 1988b, 1996a, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 
2008, 2009, 2010), the work of contemporary 
scholars such as D.N. Rodowick (1997, 2001, 
2007, 2015), Stephen Mulhall ([2001] 2008), 
Daniel Frampton (2006), David Sorfa (2006a, 
2006b, 2016, 2018), Thomas E. Wartenberg 
(2007), Daniel Shaw (2008, 2012, 2017), Berys 
Gaut (2010), Robert Sinnerbrink (2011, 2015), 
Daniel Morgan (2012), Robert B. Pippin (2012, 
2013, 2017), and Daniel Yacavone (2015). 
Additionally, for my own take on film-philosophy 
beyond the scope of this essay, see Barrowman 
(2018b). 
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Casting just a glance at film studies 
scholarship, readily apparent is the 
almost complete absence of even 
passing reference to (much less serious 
engagement with) ordinary language 
philosophy; this in spite of the fact that 
Stanley Cavell has become, along with 
Gilles Deleuze, one of the avatars of film-
philosophy. 3  I suspect that this is due 
largely to the legacy of poststructuralism 
in film studies and the tendency on the 
part of film scholars to gravitate more 
towards work that is closer (or, in Cavell’s 
case, to ignore the portions of people’s 																																																													
3 For my part, while I consider Cavell to be one of 
the most brilliant and provocative philosophers 
to have devoted time and energy to thinking 
about film, I consider Deleuze (as well as, to be 
perfectly frank, all philosophers who can be said 
to fall under the postmodernist/poststructuralist 
umbrella) to be unreadable in the sense given to 
the term by Ayn Rand (Rand [1973] 1982; see 
also Barrowman 2017). Beyond my antipathy for 
writing with obnoxiously profligate prose and 
insufferably labyrinthine ‘logic’ and which 
succumbs to/promulgates the illusion that 
complexity of argumentation is commensurate 
with complexity of thought (cf. Sokal and 
Bricmont [{1997} 1999]), Deleuze merely dresses 
up in idiosyncratic jargon rehashed arguments of 
classical film theory proposed with greater clarity 
and profundity by the likes of Sergei Eisenstein 
and André Bazin and taken up subsequently with 
greater fecundity and erudition by the likes of 
Cavell ([1971] 1979), Dudley Andrew (1976, 
1984a), and David Bordwell (1974, 1993, 1997). 
And this is to say nothing of the more recent 
work done on classical film theory which serves 
as a much more useful mode of scholarship 
exemplified by Miriam Hansen’s work on 
Siegfried Kracauer (Hansen 1997, 2011), Daniel 
Morgan’s work on Bazin (Morgan 2006, 2011, 
2013), and Malcolm Turvey’s work on Dziga 
Vertov (Turvey 2014) to cite but a few examples. 
Indeed, the Spring 2014 issue of October 
spearheaded by Turvey has paved the way for the 
path down which scholars interested in classical 
film theory and the possibilities of film-
philosophy should travel rather than following 
people like Deleuze into the jargony abyss of 
‘rhizomes’, ‘arborescence’, ‘multiplicities’, ‘images 
of thought’, etc. ad nauseam. 
work that is not close enough) in spirit to 
poststructuralism. 4  In any event, the 
point is that, for as well-known as 
Cavell’s writings on film have become, 
ordinary language philosophy is far from 
common coin in film studies. To that 
end, rather than rushing right into my 
discussion of Pulp Fiction, I must first 
provide a sense of the orientation and 
the method of ordinary language 
philosophy.  
 
As it was famously described by Austin, 
ordinary language philosophy is 
concerned with establishing ‘what we 
should say when, and so why and what 
we should mean by it’ (Austin [1956] 
1961, 129). Perhaps the most lucid and 
succinct description of the philosophical 
orientation of ordinary language 
philosophy is provided by Cavell in the 
following passage from his book The 
Claim of Reason: 
 
When … any philosopher appealing to 
ordinary language ‘says what we say’, 
what he produces is not a 
generalization (though he may, later, 
generalize), but a (supposed) instance 
of what we say. We may think of it as a 
sample. The introduction of the 
sample by the words ‘We say…’ is an 
invitation for you to see whether you 
have such a sample, or can accept 
mine as a sound one … An initial 
disagreement may be overcome; it 
may turn out that we were producing 
samples of different things (e.g. 
imagining a situation differently) or 
that one of us had not looked carefully 
at the sample he produced … It is not 
a matter of saying something false. 
Nor is it an inability or refusal to say 
something or to hear something … At 
such a crossroads, we have to 																																																													
4 For elaborate philosophical investigations into 
the problematic legacy of poststructuralism in 
the philosophy of art generally and in film studies 
specifically, see Barrowman (2017, 2018a). 
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conclude that on this point we are 
simply different; that is, we cannot 
here speak for one another. But no 
claim has been made which has been 
disconfirmed; my authority has been 
restricted. Even if [an ordinary 
language philosopher starts] by saying 
‘We should like to say…’, then, when it 
turns out that I should not like to say 
that, he is not obliged to correct his 
statement in order to account for my 
difference; rather he retracts it in the 
face of my rebuke. He hasn’t said 
something false about ‘us’; he has 
learned that there is no us (yet, maybe 
never) to say anything about (Cavell 
1979, 19–20).5 
 
As for the method of ordinary language 
philosophy – if something so 
fundamental and commonsensical can 
even be referred to as a ‘method’6 – it 
has perhaps been most clearly and 
insistently put by Wittgenstein: 
  
The correct method in philosophy 
would really be the following: To say 
nothing except what can be [sensibly] 
said … and then, whenever someone 
else wanted to say something 
[nonsensical], to demonstrate to him 
that he had failed to give a [sensible] 
meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions. Although it would not be 
satisfying to the other person – he 
would not have the feeling that we 
were teaching him philosophy – this 																																																													
5 For a more elaborate consideration of Cavell’s 
conception of conversation, both in general 
philosophical terms and with specific reference 
to the disciplinary activities of film scholars, see 
Barrowman (2018b).  
 
6Indeed, Austin himself felt that so 
commonsensical is ordinary language philosophy 
that it ‘scarcely requires justification’, for ‘too 
evidently, there is gold in them thar hills’; more 
important to Austin was providing ‘a warning 
about the care and thoroughness needed if it is 
not to fall into disrepute’ (Austin [1956] 1961, 
129). 
method would be the only strictly 
correct one (Wittgenstein [1921] 2001, 
22–23 [4.003], 89 [6.53]). 
 
These two passages on ordinary 
language philosophy may serve as the 
conceptual anchorage for the ordinary 
language investigation of Pulp Fiction 
that I will undertake in the following 
section. Before proceeding with my 
investigation, however, I would like to 
make one further methodological point. 
With respect to the question of authorial 
intention, it is not my purpose with the 
following section, in which I will analyze 
the foot massage argument, to prove 
that it was Tarantino’s express intention 
to ‘do’ ordinary language philosophy in 
Pulp Fiction, as if he had Wittgenstein 
and Austin open on his desk while he 
was writing the screenplay. The 
connection between Tarantino’s dialogue 
and the practice of ordinary language 
philosophy is, I want to say (and will 
endeavor to prove), deeper than that, or, 
to put it another way, less extraordinary 
than that. It is my contention that 
Tarantino’s style of writing, in which is 
manifest his philosophy of 
communication, is consistent with 
ordinary language philosophy; thus, by 
referring to concepts in ordinary 
language philosophy, I hope to enable 
fans and scholars alike to understand 
and appreciate the nature and the 
function of his dialogue generally, and 
the profundity of the conversations 
between Vincent and Jules in Pulp 
Fiction specifically, on a deeper level. 
 
 
2. The Foot Massage Argument 
 
In this section, I will analyze the early 
argument in Pulp Fiction between 
Vincent and Jules over the meaning of a 
foot massage. Both ‘chapters’ of the film 
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which feature Vincent and Jules, two 
hitmen who work in the employ of the 
notorious crime boss Marsellus Wallace 
(Ving Rhames), are fueled by an 
argument. In the first chapter, the 
argument is about foot massages (in the 
second chapter, of course, the argument 
is about miracles). The foot massage 
argument stems from Vincent’s response 
to a story recounted to him by Jules 
about Marsellus and his overprotective 
nature when it comes to his wife Mia 
(Uma Thurman). 
 
Vincent has informed Jules that, at 
Marsellus’ request, he will be 
accompanying Mrs. Wallace on a night 
out while Marsellus is away on business. 
In an effort to warn his friend of the 
potentially fatal danger presented by this 
situation, Jules informs Vincent that it is 
the ‘word ‘round the campfire’ that 
Marsellus allegedly took violent revenge 
on a man named Antwan Rockamora 
(a.k.a. ‘Tony Rocky Horror’) for giving his 
wife a foot massage.7  The conversation 
over the course of which Jules tells 
Vincent this story and they find 
themselves at odds over the meaning of 
a foot massage runs as follows: 
 
Jules: You remember Antwan 
Rockamora? Half-black, half-Samoan, 
used to call him ‘Tony Rocky Horror’? 
 
Vincent: Yeah, maybe. Fat, right? 
 
																																																													
7 Though I will not insist on always using the 
word ‘allegedly’ when referring to the foot 
massage in question, I will insist that it be kept in 
mind that Tarantino went to great lengths to not 
only preserve but to tease the ambiguity of this 
alleged foot massage, about which our only 
sources of information are Jules’ ‘campfire’ tale 
and Mia’s assertion to Vincent on their ‘date’ that 
‘only thing Antwan ever touched of mine was my 
hand when he shook it…at my wedding’. 
Jules: I wouldn’t go so far as to call 
the brother fat. I mean, he got a weight 
problem, but what’s the nigga gonna 
do? He’s Samoan. 
 
Vincent: Yeah, I think I know who you 
mean. What about him? 
 
Jules: Well, Marsellus fucked him up 
good. Word ‘round the campfire is it 
was on account of Marsellus Wallace’s 
wife. 
 
Vincent: So, what’d he do? Fuck her? 
 
Jules: No, no, no, no, no, no, nothing 
that bad. 
 
Vincent: Well, then what, then? 
 
Jules: Gave her a foot massage. 
 
Vincent: A foot massage? That’s it? 
Then what’d Marsellus do? 
 
Jules: He sent a couple of cats over to 
his place. They took him out on his 
patio, threw his ass over the balcony. 
Nigga fell four stories. Had a little 
garden down at the bottom, enclosed 
in glass, like a greenhouse: Nigga fell 
through that. Since then, he kind of 
developed a speech impediment. 
 
Vincent: That’s a damn shame. But 
still, I have to say: You play with 
matches, you get burned. 
 
Jules: What do you mean? 
 
Vincent: You don’t be giving Marsellus 
Wallace’s new bride a foot massage. 
 
Jules: You don’t think he overreacted? 
 
Vincent: Antwan probably didn’t 
expect Marsellus to react the way he 
did, but he had to expect a reaction. 
 
Jules: It was a foot massage. A foot 
massage is nothing. 
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Jules’ purpose in telling Vincent this story 
is to warn him that Marsellus is 
psychotically overprotective of his wife 
and prone to violent jealousy. Vincent, 
however, responds in a way that 
surprises Jules. From Vincent’s 
perspective, whether or not Marsellus’ 
reaction upon learning that Antwan had 
given his wife a foot massage was right 
(i.e. was a justifiable response to 
Antwan’s transgression), the fact of the 
matter is that Antwan has nobody to 
blame but himself. Jules is surprised by 
Vincent’s cavalier attitude to what he 
considers heinously uncalled-for violence 
in response to what he conceives of as 
an innocent act, and what follows is an 
argument that has as its underlying point 
of disagreement the meaning of a foot 
massage. 
 
At various points in The Claim of Reason, 
Cavell schematizes argumentative claims 
and potential grounds for doubt (e.g. 
Cavell 1979, 132). For the sake of my 
analysis of the foot massage argument, I 
am going to borrow his schema and lay 
out the terms of the argument as follows: 
 
Claim (Vincent): ‘You play with 
matches, you get burned … You don’t 
be giving Marsellus Wallace’s new 
bride a foot massage’. 
 
Request for Basis (Jules): ‘You don’t 
think he overreacted?’ 
 
Basis (Vincent): ‘Antwan probably 
didn’t expect Marsellus to react the 
way he did, but he had to expect a 
reaction’. 
 
Ground for Doubt (Jules): ‘It was a 
foot massage. A foot massage is 
nothing’. 
 
The rest of the scene consists of Vincent 
trying to clarify his argument and to get 
Jules to see that, in Wittgensteinian 
terms, he had failed to give a sensible 
meaning to one of the signs in his 
propositions (viz. ‘a foot massage is 
nothing’). If Vincent is able to prove to 
Jules that his doubt is nonsensical – and 
thereby remove his doubt – then, in 
Cavellian terms, their disagreement may 
be overcome. The question at this point 
in my ordinary language investigation of 
the foot massage argument is: How 
exactly does Vincent go about clarifying 
his position? 
 
Vincent is claiming that a foot massage, 
by its very nature, should obviously, in 
such a context as the one in which 
Antwan was massaging Marsellus’ wife’s 
feet, be viewed as something not merely 
capable of eliciting but demanding a 
reaction. What the reaction is – in this 
case, being thrown off a building – is a 
separate matter, and one with which 
Vincent is importantly not concerned 
(even though it is an issue on which 
Jules is clearly hung up). 
 
Vincent is concerned with the 
implications of a man giving a woman a 
foot massage. In response to Jules’ 
nonsensical claim that ‘a foot massage is 
nothing’, Vincent, according to Austin, has 
a couple of different response options. As 
Austin discusses in his essay ‘The 
Meaning of a Word’: 
 
Suppose that in ordinary life I am 
asked: ‘What is the meaning of the 
word racy?’ There are two sorts of 
thing I may do in response: I may reply 
in words, trying to describe what 
raciness is and what it is not, to give 
examples of sentences in which one 
might use the word racy, and of others 
in which one should not. Let us call 
this sort of thing ‘explaining the 
syntactics’ of the word ‘racy’ in the 
English language. On the other hand, I 
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might do what we may call 
‘demonstrating the semantics’ of the 
word, by getting the questioner to 
imagine, or even actually to 
experience, situations which we 
should describe correctly by means of 
sentences containing the words ‘racy’, 
‘raciness’, etc., and again other 
situations where we should not use 
these words … And in the same way, if 
I wished to find out ‘whether he 
understands the meaning of the word 
racy’, I should test him at some length 
in these two ways (Austin [1940] 1961, 
25). 
 
As it happens, this is exactly what 
Vincent proceeds to do. He first explains 
the syntactics with respect to a foot 
massage: It is, as he defines it, ‘laying 
your hands in a familiar way’ on 
someone. But Jules is not conceding the 
intimacy that Vincent is alleging is part 
and parcel of foot massages. So, Vincent 
next shifts to demonstrating the 
semantics. His first attempt is to 
construct an analogy. He correctly 
senses that Jules feels that he is putting 
too much weight on foot massages. To 
help disabuse Jules of this, Vincent 
analogizes giving a woman a foot 
massage to giving a woman oral sex. 
 
Here, Vincent is choosing an obviously 
charged act in order to bring into clearer 
focus precisely how much weight he is 
putting on foot massages. He very plainly 
states that a man giving a married 
woman a foot massage is not as bad as 
a man giving a married woman oral sex, 
but it is, in his words, in ‘the same 
fucking ballpark’. Vincent has, in effect, 
produced a sample. He has, in Cavellian 
terms, extended to Jules an invitation for 
him to see whether he has such a 
sample, or can at the very least accept 
Vincent’s as a sound one. Cavell probes 
further the nature and the stakes of this 
invitation, which he calls, in a decidedly 
Austinian spirit, ‘an invitation to 
projective imagination’, in the following 
passage: 
 
[Projective imagination is] merely a 
startling title for a family of the most 
common of human capacities, e.g. the 
capacity to ‘imagine what would have 
happened if you had gotten there a 
day late’, to ‘suppose you have three 
rabbits’, to ‘think how you would feel if 
that had happened to you’. You may 
on a given occasion fail to meet one 
or other of these requests; but you 
won’t, in failing there, have failed the 
way you would have failed to meet a 
request for a prediction when your 
prediction proves inaccurate. If your 
prediction fails you, you may have 
spoken too hastily, neglected 
considerations which are obviously 
relevant; or the most surprising 
eventualities (which ‘couldn’t have 
been predicted’) have arisen. But if 
your imagination fails you, it probably 
will not be obvious why (Cavell 1979, 
147–148). 
 
Vincent has invited Jules to imagine foot 
massages as not identical to but at least 
analogous to – in Vincent’s terms, in ‘the 
same fucking ballpark’ as – oral sex. But 
Jules’ imagination fails him. He rejects 
that analogy immediately and 
vehemently. For Jules, there ‘ain’t no 
fucking ballpark’. Why not? Because, 
according to him, ‘foot massages don’t 
mean shit’. 
 
Vincent realizes that Jules’ imagination 
has failed him, although it is not obvious 
why. It could be the case – and, in Pulp 
Fiction, it proves to be the case – that 
Vincent has simply failed to make 
perspicuous his invitation to projective 
imagination, has failed to produce the 
right sample for his audience. As Cavell 
explains: 
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What will be story enough to get 
someone to imagine what you invite 
him to consider is not fixed. To get 
someone to imagine that he or she 
has three rabbits and that he is given 
three more, you will not need much 
more than those words themselves. To 
get him to imagine what he would do 
if he held such and such a bridge 
hand, you may have to include the 
information as to whether he or his 
opponents are vulnerable, and give 
more information about the styles of 
bidding of each of the players. To get 
someone to imagine how Hamlet felt 
at the play, you may have to tap your 
own imagination at a deeper stratum 
to find the relevant details of that 
situation and to find the 
corresponding experiences within your 
life and the life of your audience 
(Cavell 1979, 152). 
 
Of course, it could have turned out that 
Jules had some sort of psychological 
blockage. It could have been the case 
that he was once severely beaten for 
talking to a man’s girlfriend at a club, 
and now, faced with a situation so 
similar, is refusing to give an inch to 
Vincent out of anger at that past 
memory. Vincent, however, seems to 
think – and he is proven correct – that 
the problem is not so extensive, that he 
has simply failed to make clear the 
relevant details of the situation in 
question and to find the corresponding 
experiences within the life of his 
audience. 
 
Given that Vincent knows Jules very well, 
he changes tactics. He not only invites 
Jules to imagine a context in which he is 
giving a foot massage; he invites Jules to 
experience giving a man a foot massage. 
If, according to Jules, ‘foot massages 
don’t mean shit’, if there is nothing 
intimate or sexual about them, then it 
should make no difference to him 
whether he massages the feet of a 
married woman, his mother, or 
Vincent…but it does. Vincent has found 
the right tool – homophobia, from which 
any hypermasculine heterosexual man, 
and especially the cool, Shaft-esque ‘bad 
motherfucker’ Jules, must immediately 
distance himself – to get Jules to see 
that, as he puts it later, ‘there’s a 
sensuous thing going on’ when a man 
gives a woman a foot massage. 
 
This is not to say that Jules is convinced. 
Vincent has forced him to acknowledge a 
contradiction in his belief system, but it 
remains for him to make perspicuous his 
central argumentative claim. Having 
reached this point of contradiction, Jules 
responds by saying that just because he 
‘wouldn’t give no man a foot massage 
don’t make it right for Marsellus to throw 
Antwan off a building into a glass 
motherfucking house fucking up the way 
the nigga talks. That shit ain’t right’. It is 
clear to Vincent at this point that Jules 
has conflated the claim that Vincent is 
making – that a foot massage is, or at 
the very least can be, a suggestive and 
sexually-charged act – with another 
claim that Vincent is importantly not 
making – that Marsellus was right to 
throw Antwan off a building for giving his 
wife a foot massage. 
 
As they work in this final exchange to 
clarify their positions and come to an 
understanding, the single most important 
phrase said by either man emerges. That 
phrase, which, significantly, each 
character says to the other in this final 
exchange, is, ‘You know what I’m sayin’?’ 
This phrase signals their efforts to, in 
Cavellian terms, preserve the ‘us’ 
between them, to check whether they 
are able to speak for one another, to 
speak representatively, to share in what 
Wittgenstein famously conceptualized as 
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a ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein [1949] 1967; 
Cavell 1979, 30–36). 
 
Jules states that throwing a man off a 
building just because he gave your wife a 
foot massage is not right, and he asks 
Vincent if he knows what he is saying. 
Vincent assures Jules that he does, 
indeed, know what he is saying, and that, 
for his part, he is not arguing that 
Marsellus’ reaction to his wife getting a 
foot massage from another man was 
right, but simply that a reaction should 
have been expected and, indeed, was 
warranted given the nature of foot 
massages. He then asks Jules if he 
knows what he is saying, and Jules 
assures Vincent that he does, indeed, 
know what he is saying. Over the course 
of their argument, they overcame their 
initial disagreement, clarified the terms 
of their positions, and reaffirmed that, 
between them, there is, in fact, an ‘us’. 
More than merely a convenient example 
to illustrate concepts in ordinary 
language philosophy, the foot massage 
argument in Pulp Fiction is equally a 
model of how to argue, of how to have a 
reasonable disagreement while at the 
same time preserving one’s relationship 
with one’s interlocutor. If philosophy is, 
as Cavell conceives of it, ‘the education 
of grownups’ (Cavell 1979, 125), then, 
with respect to the ordinary language 
philosophy of Quentin Tarantino, Pulp 
Fiction is a lesson in how to have a 
grownup argument – a lesson, in short, 
in ‘how to do things with words’ (Austin 
1962). 
 
 
3. Film, Philosophy, and Film-
Philosophy 
 
The material in the previous section 
consisted of the content of my 
presentation at the IFVCR Network 
conference, ‘“You Talkin’ to Me?”: 
Dialogue and Communication in Film’. 
My modest aim was to demonstrate, first, 
that Tarantino’s justly famous dialogue 
still has much to offer scholarly analysis, 
and, second, that ordinary language 
philosophy can serve as a powerful 
critical tool in the analysis of dialogue 
and communication in film. As a perk, I 
hoped to put film-philosophy on blast a 
bit. Recalling Wittgenstein’s statement on 
method – in particular, his point about 
not being satisfied that one was actually 
being taught philosophy – I had the 
sense that my ordinary language 
investigation of Pulp Fiction might seem 
so straightforward (or so ordinary) as to 
not even qualify as ‘properly’ 
philosophical. But I thought that if this 
was borne out in the response to my 
presentation then it would indicate a 
problem with how scholars understand 
‘proper’ philosophy, and, more 
specifically, ‘proper’ film-philosophy. To 
that end, I hoped to get a little pushback 
on what I was doing and the way that I 
was going about doing it.  
 
Fortunately, my presentation had the 
desired effect. The conference organizer, 
Evelina Kazakeviciute, expressed to me 
that she felt that my presentation lacked 
something, that it was not philosophical 
enough. Expressing a similar sentiment, 
one of our conference keynotes, Dr. 
David Sorfa, asked me in the discussion 
period after my presentation, ‘Why film?’ 
The implication of this question seemed 
to me to be that perhaps I ought to be 
worried that I was ‘reducing’ Pulp Fiction 
to literature by separating off from the 
film as film its construction of dialogue 
at the level of the screenplay. In other 
words, it appeared that I was being 
confronted with the fact that not only 
was my philosophical orientation not 
philosophical enough, but moreover, my 
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film-philosophical orientation was not 
film-philosophical enough.8 
 
At bottom, I think that the two questions 
animating these concerns are, first, ‘What 
is film?’, and, second, ‘What is 
philosophy?’ From these two questions, 
of course, springs the question that film 
scholars have in recent years been 
devoting more and more attention to, 
namely, ‘What is film-philosophy?’ To my 
mind, Cavell has provided the most 
thought-provoking answers to these 
questions. A film, according to his 
definition, is ‘a succession of automatic 
world projections’ (Cavell [1971] 1979, 
72), a definition which he and a number 
of other scholars have gone a long way 
towards clarifying. 9  Philosophy, 
meanwhile, is for Cavell ‘a willingness to 
think not about something other than 
what ordinary human beings think 
about’, but rather, ‘to learn to think 
undistractedly about things that ordinary 
human beings cannot help thinking 
about, or anyway cannot help having 
occur to them’ (Cavell [1981] 2005, 92).  
 
As for what film-philosophy is, or 
could/should be, Cavell has 
acknowledged that, ‘since I find in 																																																													
8 For the record, what follows is not meant as an 
assault on my colleagues for questioning my 
(film-)philosophical orientation. I did not take 
their questioning to be a rebuke. Rather, I took 
their questioning to be attempts to further this 
conversation and to encourage me to broaden 
its concerns in the interest of designating 
potentially insightful avenues down which 
scholars might travel in future film-philosophical 
efforts. For that, I am grateful, and I hope that this 
section may serve as a substantial return on their 
investments in my ideas. 
 
9For elucidations of/elaborations on Cavell’s 
ontology of film, see, among others, William 
Rothman and Marian Keane (2000), Rodowick 
(2007, 2015), Morgan (2015), and, for my own 
take, Barrowman (2019a). 
movies food for thought, I go for help in 
thinking about what I understand them 
to be thinking about where I go for help 
in thinking about anything, to the 
thinkers I know best and trust most’ 
(Cavell [1981] 2005, 91). On this point, it 
warrants mentioning that there is an 
unfortunate implication in Cavell’s sense 
of how to proceed in a film-philosophy 
register. Cavell seems to be implying 
that, in every instance, the best option 
for understanding a film is to turn to ‘the 
thinkers [one] know[s] best’. But that may 
not always be the best option. This was 
brought home for me in the discussion 
period after I gave my presentation, 
during which our other conference 
keynote, Professor John Mowitt, brought 
up the centrality of the voice – 
particularly the sound of one’s voice and 
the need to not only understand what is 
said but to listen to and to hear the way 
that what is said is said – in Inglourious 
Basterds (2009). For my part, I would like 
to stress that for me to automatically 
assume that just because I think that 
Tarantino’s style of dialogue has a 
fundamental connection to ordinary 
language philosophy, and just because I 
am more familiar with the work of 
ordinary language philosophers than I 
am with the work of most other 
philosophers, that the best/only way to 
answer every question that might 
possibly arise as to the 
meaning/significance of something in 
one of his films, such as the centrality of 
the voice in Inglourious Basterds, is 
going to be with reference to ordinary 
language philosophy would be 
egregiously fallacious (not to mention 
affrontingly and inexcusably lazy).10  
																																																													
10 In fact, should one find intriguing the prospect 
of exploring the significance of the voice in 
Inglourious Basterds, I cannot think of a better 
place to begin one’s investigation than Professor 
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In any ‘act of criticism’ (Cavell [1971] 
1979, 219), as Cavell refers to them, 
one’s ‘elementary critical obligation’ is 
the successful demonstration of the 
utility of one’s critical tools (Britton 
[1986] 2009, 383). However, it is equally 
worth stressing that it is also crucially 
important that one be capable of 
recognizing when a particular critical tool 
is unsuitable for a particular critical job, 
for, as Andrew Britton averred, if one is 
incapable of doing so one risks debasing 
oneself and, indeed, debasing criticism 
as such. As he explained:  
 
The interests of film theory are not 
served by finding in every ‘realist’ text 
a confirmation of the Lacanian (or 
Foucauldian or Derridean or whatever) 
‘problematic’, or by proselytizing for 
the mass production of ‘modernist’ 
texts which flatter the presuppositions 
embodied in the attack on realism. 
Characteristically, and deplorably, such 
theory reduces the objects it purports 
to theorize to mere pretexts for 
rationalizing the validity of its own 
premises, and it makes a virtue of its 
refusal of all cognitive controls by 
denouncing any concern for the 
material integrity of the text as 
‘empiricism’ (Britton [1986] 2009, 383). 
 
Of course, to speak in such a register as 
this, with reference to critical ‘jobs’ and 
‘tools’, is to presuppose that it is possible 
to (objectively) know the job (i.e. the film) 
before opening up one’s toolkit. That is, it 
presupposes that the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of a given critical tool 
(such as ordinary language philosophy) is 
determinable only with reference to the 
objective content of the film on which 
one plans to use that tool.  
 
																																																																																								
Mowitt’s own recent examination of ‘sounds’ 
(Mowitt 2015). 
This, however, flies in the face of the 
received ‘wisdom’ in film studies 
according to which, far from the 
objective content of a film determining 
the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of a given critical tool, 
the critical tool is (implicitly or explicitly) 
held to ‘determine’ the ‘objective 
content’. This is what I refer to as the 
paradigm subjectivity argument, the 
terms of which have actually been 
explicitly laid out by Professor Mowitt 
himself: 
 
Questions that bear on the 
institutional maintenance of the 
hermeneutical field as such [such as 
which critical tool is most appropriate 
for a given film] … are not concerns 
which come after the particular text in 
question or which are properly 
‘extrinsic’ to it – they are concerns 
which address the very definition of 
the textual artifact as an artifact. 
Insofar as the artifact is meaningful … 
it is because [scholars] continue to 
support the [hermeneutical] structures 
… which read the artifact on their 
terms (Mowitt 1992, 214–215). 
 
The paradigm subjectivity argument has 
been running rampant in film studies for 
decades. 11  Dudley Andrew has argued 
that ‘there is no objective truth about 
signification in films, only a tradition of 
reading them in such and such a way’ 																																																													
11Even though I am remaining within the 
disciplinary confines of film studies, the influence 
across both the sciences and the humanities of 
Thomas Kuhn cannot be overstated, for it was 
Kuhn who gave currency to the paradigm 
subjectivity argument with the simple yet 
destructively mistaken postulation that ‘a 
paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself’ 
(Kuhn 1970, 113; cf. Merrill 1991, 97–98, 170–
172; Sokal and Bricmont [1997] 1999, 67–73; 
Hicks 2004, 74–83; and Binswanger 2014, 383–
390). For more thorough refutations of the 
paradigm subjectivity argument, see Barrowman 
(2018b, 2019b). 
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(Andrew 1984b: 14). Likewise, Slavoj Žižek 
has argued that postulating the 
existence of a given film as an ‘objective 
reality’ merely ‘begs the question of what 
“objective reality” means … [for] the 
procedures of posing problems and 
finding solutions to them always and by 
definition occur within a certain 
[paradigm] that determines which 
problems are crucial and which 
solutions acceptable’ (Žižek 2001, 17–
18). 
 
What is missing from the paradigm 
subjectivity argument is the concept of 
objectivity (hence its name). In addition 
to tacitly (illicitly) assuming that there is 
no objectively existing film to which 
scholars can refer in examining claims 
made following the use of a given critical 
tool, it is also tacitly (illicitly) assumed 
that conversation and debate between 
paradigms is impossible (cf. Carroll 
1992). In the case of Pulp Fiction, if it is 
true that I have ‘created’ the meaning of 
the foot massage argument by virtue of 
my utilization of ordinary language 
philosophy, then it would be impossible 
for another scholar to falsify my claims 
beyond the coordinates of ordinary 
language philosophy (indeed, it would be 
nonsensical if not inconceivable for 
another scholar to even [want to] try to 
do so). Moreover, if another scholar were 
to advance a different set of claims 
having used a different critical tool, then 
it would be equally 
impossible/nonsensical/inconceivable 
for me to (want to) try to use ordinary 
language philosophy to falsify their 
claims. In short, the very concepts of 
true/false, right/wrong, good/bad, etc., 
would have no place in the conversation. 
Needless to say, this would make for a 
film-philosophy rooted in very bad 
philosophy.12 
 
But that is a fight for another day. For the 
moment, I believe that I have 
successfully alleviated any concerns 
pertaining to the potential utility of 
ordinary language philosophy in the 
context of film-philosophy. However, I 
have yet to address the related concern 
that, even if ordinary language 
philosophy may be useful in the context 
of film-philosophy, its utility comes at too 
great a cost. That is, if the utility of 
ordinary language philosophy comes at 
the cost of reducing film to literature, 
then the cost is clearly too high for film-
philosophy. These worries seem to not 
only presuppose a very rigid ‘essence’ of 
film befitting the likes of a Rudolf 
Arnheim, they also seem to presuppose 
a ‘proper’, ‘holistic’ form of film criticism. 
On top of which, they imply that Pulp 
Fiction is a bad film qua film, for, if all 
that can be said about it can be said 
with reference to the screenplay, then 
what virtue is there in saying anything 
about it in the context of film-
philosophy?  
 
For me personally, as a die-hard 
Tarantino fan, this is a far more serious 
set of issues, for at stake is not only the 
validity of ordinary language philosophy 
as a critical tool for film scholars, but 																																																													
12 For more detailed examinations of such bad 
philosophy, see Barrowman (2017, 2018a, 2018b, 
2019b). Broadly speaking, the ‘logic’ here is 
endemic of a virulent strain of irrationalism in 
academia that has already been criticized by 
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, who noted in their 
trenchant (and sadly still relevant) critique of 
humanistic inquiry the pernicious efforts to hive 
scholars off ‘into cultures and groups having their 
own conceptual universes – sometimes even 
their own “realities” – and virtually unable to 
communicate with one another’ (Sokal and 
Bricmont [1997] 1999, 92). 
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even more importantly, the status of one 
of my favorite films as film. These issues 
can be traced at least as far back as V.F. 
Perkins’ landmark book Film as Film: 
Understanding and Judging Movies, in 
which he expressed the following 
concern with respect to the analysis of 
film as film: 
 
Balance [between cinematic elements] 
will go unappreciated unless we 
respond to movies as a synthetic form, 
since none of the elements in the 
synthesis has a separate importance. 
The parts are of interest as we relate 
them, not in isolation. A literary 
approach [such as my approach to the 
foot massage argument in Pulp 
Fiction] … reduces the film [to 
literature] ... and then tries to assess 
the value and significance of the 
resulting form of words (Perkins [1972] 
1993, 78–79). 
 
While I agree with Perkins that to truly 
understand a film one must approach it 
synthetically – that is, one must analyze 
its elements in conjunction – I disagree 
that parts of films have no interest in 
isolation.13 In fact, prior to isolating the 
dialogue of Pulp Fiction and conducting 
my ordinary language investigation at the 
level of the screenplay, I had never been 
able to appreciate the intricacy of 
Tarantino’s mise-en-scène. In the 
discussion period, Professor Mowitt 
pointed out the subtlety of Tarantino’s 
blocking as Vincent and Jules argued in 
the hallway of the apartment complex in 
which they were planning on executing 
their hit for Marsellus. Far from reducing 
the film to literature, examining the 																																																													
13 And I am by no means the first scholar to 
explicitly or implicitly reject Perkins’ position 
here. For philosophical justifications for what has 
alternatively been called ‘middle-level’ or 
‘piecemeal’ scholarship, see Bordwell (1989a, 
1989b, 1989c, 1996) and Carroll (1996a, 1996b).  
dialogue in Pulp Fiction in isolation from 
the rest of the film allowed me to 
achieve an enhanced synthetic 
understanding of and appreciation for 
the film as film, for it was not until I had 
fully comprehended the implications of 
the foot massage argument that I was 
able to understand and appreciate the 
significance of Tarantino’s visual 
strategies. 
 
In the early portion of their argument, as 
Vincent is explaining the syntactics and 
demonstrating the semantics of foot 
massages, he is walking behind Jules, as 
if trying to catch-up with him, as if trying 
to realign himself with Jules physically in 
a manner analogous to the way that he 
is trying to realign himself with Jules 
conceptually (while Jules, meanwhile, so 
sure of himself and so deaf to Vincent’s 
claims, is not even deigning to look at 
Vincent, dismissing his claims with 
flippant hand gestures meant to wave 
him off). Added to which, it is not 
insignificant that, at the moment at 
which Vincent extends to Jules his 
invitation to projective imagination vis-à-
vis giving a man a foot massage, they are 
framed in a two-shot so as to emphasize 
the import of the moment when Vincent 
steps forward, attempting to close the 
(physical and conceptual) distance 
between them, to ask, ‘Would you give a 
guy a foot massage?’ Also of note is the 
decision to shoot this sequence with a 
Steadicam and to avoid disrupting the 
flow of the conversation with cuts. By 
shooting this sequence as a long take, 
Tarantino was able to add dramatic 
weight to this moment, with the camera 
becoming stationary as they confront 
one another and only becoming mobile 
again after Jules retorts, ‘Fuck you’, and 
disengages, conceding Vincent’s point. 
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And this by no means exhausts the 
aesthetic richness of this sequence, to 
say nothing of the rest of the film. Pulp 
Fiction is, synthetically, an extraordinarily 
well-crafted film. That said, it is 
nevertheless possible – and, as this 
example has hopefully demonstrated, 
potentially even incumbent upon 
scholars – to isolate elements of films in 
order to better understand the elements 
themselves, which, in turn, may produce 
more comprehensive understandings of 
how various elements function 
synthetically in the larger contexts of 
films as films. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
It goes without saying that, as a relatively 
new endeavor, the possibilities of film-
philosophy are only just beginning to 
emerge. In this essay, I have tried to 
make a case for the utility of ordinary 
language philosophy as a critical tool for 
scholars interested in analyzing dialogue 
and communication in film. Additionally, 
in light of the conversations that were 
initiated at the IFVCR Network 
conference, I sought to expand this 
discussion of ordinary language 
philosophy in the context of Pulp Fiction 
to consider some broader concerns for 
the future of film-philosophy. It is with 
the future of film-philosophy in mind that 
I would like to conclude this essay. 
 
In 1996, David Bordwell and Noël Carroll 
famously declared that the discipline of 
film studies had entered the ‘post-
Theory’ age (Bordwell and Carroll 1996). 
This declaration was the culmination of 
two decades of intellectual combat 
within film studies centering on what was 
often referred to as ‘Grand Theory’ (or, 
more pejoratively, ‘SLAB Theory’, for 
Saussure, Lacan, Althusser, and Barthes 
[Bordwell 1989b]) and which Bordwell 
and Carroll defined as that ‘aggregate of 
doctrines derived from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, structuralist semiotics, 
poststructuralist literary theory, and 
variants of Althusserian Marxism’ 
(Bordwell and Carroll 1996, xiii). 
Surveying the last two decades of film 
studies scholarship, it seems to be true 
that film studies is by and large post-
Theory. And, with the current popularity 
of film-philosophy, most contemporary 
film scholars seem eager to chart new 
territory and leave to the past the battles 
over Grand Theory. However, scholars 
would do well to remember Carroll’s 
insistence that, ‘however the demise of 
Theory came about’, the fact that film 
studies had entered the post-Theory age 
did not mean that there were not still 
‘major obstacles’ in its path. In fact, 
Carroll warned that, ‘as long as these 
obstacles continue to grip the 
imaginations of scholars’, it is ‘unlikely’ 
that film studies will be able to escape 
the ‘legacies’ of Grand Theory and truly 
thrive (Carroll 1996b, 38).  
 
For as much as the philosophical 
sophistication of film studies has 
increased since Bordwell and Carroll 
inaugurated the age of post-Theory, I 
have had the sinking suspicion that this 
is precisely the disciplinary drama that is 
currently being played out. The legacies 
of Grand Theory still seem to have a firm 
grip on the imaginations of 
contemporary film scholars (as 
evidenced by the lasting influence of the 
paradigm subjectivity argument and the 
zombie-like persistence of 
poststructuralism), and I think that film-
philosophy presents scholars with the 
opportunity to distinguish between and 
hierarchically organize the philosophical 
and hermeneutic value of the myriad 
conceptual orientations and critical 
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methodologies on offer. Carroll once 
remarked (indicating his preference for 
‘robust pluralism’ as opposed to 
‘coexistence pluralism’ [Carroll 1996b, 
62–67]) that, in the history of the still 
comparatively young and immature field 
of film studies, orientations and 
methodologies have been embraced and 
disavowed (with a randomness that I 
think is more befitting the world of 
fashion), yet, amidst this flurry of 
scholarly activity, ‘what may be of use 
and what is plainly wrong has not been 
sorted out properly’ (Carroll 1996a, 291).  
 
I hope that, in this essay, I have sorted 
out the fact that, and how, ordinary 
language philosophy can be of use. As 
for the myriad orientations and 
methodologies that have at one time or 
another appeared on the film studies 
stage – to say nothing of the myriad 
orientations and methodologies that 
have yet to receive a hearing – I think 
that it is safe to say that film-philosophy 
has its work cut out. I think that there is 
an untold number of conversations that 
need to be started/resumed in film 
studies. And some conversations will 
invariably be politer than others. Some 
conversations may be downright 
polemical. There may even be times 
when scholars will feel compelled to 
shout at one another in their loudest 
Samuel L. Jackson voice, ‘English, 
motherfucker, do you speak it?’ But I do 
not think that scholars should shy away 
from future battles in the spirit of the old 
‘Theory Wars’. After all, as Cavell once 
quipped: ‘Lines are to be drawn, or 
what’s a conversation for?’ (Cavell 1981, 
227). 
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